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A FEMINIST VINDICATION OF MARY 
WOLLSTONECRAFT
Julie A. Monroe
In 1928, VIRGINIA Woolf made a statement which could well be 
addressed to today’s feminist critics: “Towards the end of the eigh­
teenth century a change came about which, if I were rewriting history, 
I should describe more fully and think of greater importance than the 
Crusades or the Wars of the Roses. The middle-class woman began to 
write.”1 Mary Wollstonecraft is exemplary of those history-making 
women. Her book, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, published in 
1792, was the first truly feminist treatise acknowledged by the English 
public. Its continuing literary and historical importance is demon­
strated by the many recent critics who have addressed Wollstonecraft’s 
sometimes dated, sometimes surprisingly modern, themes, as well as 
her unusually diverse writing style. Yet curiously, contemporary 
feminist critics have written little in direct response to this trail-blazing 
work. Perhaps their neglect stems from the fact that many of 
Wollstonecraft’s goals are accomplished and her then revolutionary 
ideas now seem obvious: “One thus may be tempted to sneer that 
Wollstonecraft’s thesis has survived her stylistic experiment only 
because that thesis is an idea whose time has finally come.”2 If it is only 
in recent times that Wollstonecraft’s ideas have been assimilated into 
commonly received notions, then there is no better time for feminist 
critics to further examine her philosophical treatise regarding its 
historical background, its often criticized style (as the above quotation 
suggests), and its contemporary relevance in the light of recent 
feminist literary theory.
Carolyn Korsmeyer suggests three theses for A Vindication. First of 
all, Wollstonecraft argues that Reason is essential for the development 
of moral, virtuous character. Secondly, women lack Reason, not 
because they are biologically incapable of it, but because they are 
denied the educational opportunities that encourage the development
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of rational intellect. Finally, the common distinction between “mascu­
line” and “feminine” virtues must be eradicated because Reason, the 
basis of all virtue, makes no gender distinctions.3 Though the terms of 
Wollstonecraft’s arguments may seem dated with the emphases on 
Reason and morality, it seems to me that feminist issues today do not, 
or should not, deal any less with such terms. Certainly we do not hold 
Reason, with a capital R, in the ultimate esteem of the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century philosophers, and our concept of morality has 
surely become more secular, relating more to ideals of equality and 
individual freedom than to our relationship with a supreme deity. 
Nevertheless, the struggle for a less prejudiced society founded on the 
manifest equality of human beings must remain a modern goal.
Recent critics, in fact, do not question Wollstonecraft’s basic themes 
but respond more specifically to the apparent ideological contradic­
tions in A Vindication. Anca Vlasopolos finds fault with the fact that 
Wollstonecraft addresses her feminist treatise almost entirely to men, 
even divorcing herself from her own sex by referring to women as 
“them”; furthermore, Wollstonecraft condescends to women, berat­
ing them for behaving in exactly the ways she claims society has 
directed them .4 Secondly, Wollstonecraft has been criticized for 
failing to take her thesis beyond the limits of bourgeois ideology to its 
logical, radical conclusion.5 For example, despite her evocation of a 
“revolution in female manners,” Wollstonecraft never transcends the 
preconceptions of the traditional female roles of wife, mother, and 
daughter .6 Finally, much of the recent criticism is directed at 
Wollstonecraft’s writing style, particularly her deviations from philo­
sophical discourse into emotional tirades and allegedly irrelevant 
issues.7
To refute these invectives properly and to vindicate Mary 
Wollstonecraft, we must look to the most current feminist literary 
theory. A fundamental tenet of this discourse, formulated primarily in 
response to the New Criticism, asserts the necessity of examining texts 
within their proper contexts. The idea of “art for art’s sake,” partic­
ularly in the shadow of New Criticism, suggests that there is a 
universal point of view, an absolute standard forjudging texts, outside 
of the contexts of history, culture, and gender. Feminist theory has 
demonstrated that this “universal” viewpoint is generally white, 
Anglo-Saxon, protestant and male. Thus, to conduct a proper femi­
nist investigation of Wollstonecraft’s treatise, we must examine it in its 
correct historical context.
Wollstonecraft wrote A Vindication of the Rights of Woman in reponse 
to the French Revolution. The rise of middle-class values—liberalism, 
humanitarianism, and egalitarianism—all the values that inform
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present Western social and political systems, led Wollstonecraft to 
conceive of new and more powerful roles for women as well as for 
men. During the early stages of the “bourgeois revolution,” 
Wollstonecraft desperately tried to include the enfranchisement of 
women in the new society. That her feminist goals were not accepted 
in the eighteenth century attests to the great wall of patriarchy she was 
up against; that she recognized the oppressive architecture of that 
bourgeois structure so early in its construction demonstrates her 
extraordinary insight into the problems of her time as well as our own.
From this historical perspective, we can account for the fact that A 
Vindication is addressed primarily to men by noting that 
Wollstonecraft composed her treatise in response to those written by 
the male philosophers of the period. She revered the liberal hum an­
itarian ideals of equal rights for all men propounded by such writers 
as Edmund Burke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Her complaint con­
cerned their failure to consider women in these visions of a new 
bourgeois society: “Wollstonecraft embraces Rousseau’s commitments 
to independence and freedom and parts with him only in his exclusion 
of women from this life of independence .”8 Furthermore, 
Wollstonecraft respected the men themselves, perhaps to an extreme, 
as supreme philosophers and as embodiments of Reason itself. Her 
failure to condemn those who were proclaiming women’s inferiority 
can be best understood through the feminist theoretical concept of the 
“double-bind.” Although Wollstonecraft recognized women’s oppres­
sion and the fact that these respected treatises reinforced sexist 
attitudes, she nonetheless identified with those philosophers who 
shared her own humanitarian values. Thus, Wollstonecraft could not 
alienate herself from the writers she was not only addressing but also 
striving to emulate.
Wollstonecraft may also have directed her treatise toward these men 
for the very practical reason that only they had political force, the 
power to change things. Vlasopolos argues, however, that 
Wollstonecraft defers too much to her male audience, making unnec­
essary concessions to avoid alienating the influential and using flattery 
to mitigate the issues that make men feel least secure .9 Elizabeth 
Robins, though writing over a century later as the first President of the 
Women Writers Suffrage League, provides what was and is still the 
most appropriate feminist defense against accusations of this sort: 
“Contrary to the popular impression, to say in print what she thinks is 
the last thing the woman-novelist or journalist is so rash as to attempt. 
There even more than elsewhere (unless she is reckless) she must wear 
the aspect that shall have the best chance of pleasing her brothers. 
Her publishers are not women .”10
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A perhaps more insulting point for women today is not only that 
Wollstonecraft speaks of women as separate from herself, but that she 
condescends to them as well, chiding them for their unenlightened 
conduct. But Wollstonecraft herself must have been confused as to 
her political role in an age when “true ‘writer’ signifie[d] assertion 
while true ‘woman’ signifie[d] submission.”11 Writing political tracts in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was indeed an exclusively 
male activity. Thus, Wollstonecraft should not be condemned for 
failing to overtly recognize her emotional and sexual identity when 
she was a woman alone in her “masculine” intellectual pursuits. It is 
more difficult, however, to defend her against accusations of conde­
scension, when she would have been the first to declare that women 
were not entirely responsible for their behavior. Perhaps the only 
explanation lies in the frustration she must have experienced as an 
eighteenth-century feminist striving to achieve a goal for the benefit 
of all women only to meet resistance from so many women either by 
choice or by ignorance.
Mary Poovey also chides Wollstonecraft for failing to recognize 
women as her natural allies in the battle for equal rights . 12 
Wollstonecraft, however, was well aware of the sad state of the 
eighteenth-century woman’s intellectual competence and cannot be 
faulted for admitting the distressing fact that most women would 
prove poor comrades in the fight for political equality: “It will also 
require some time to convince women that they act contrary to their 
real interest on an enlarged scale, when they cherish or affect 
weakness under the name of delicacy.”13 Furthermore, Wollstonecraft 
understood then what is still true today: the battle is not men versus 
women but progress versus the status quo. In 1792, it was the 
philosophers, the men, who were striving to change societal inequal­
ities while the majority of women strove only for the one power they 
could perceive as attainable, the power to grant or deny their sexual 
favors. There is a certain irony in the fact that women today are still 
fighting for that inalienable right.
Poovey aims another reproach at Wollstonecraft for her failure to 
extend her ideas beyond the limits of bourgeois ideology. 14 But as 
Juliet Mitchell points out in Woman's Estate, revolutionary ideas must 
be articulated first within the structure of the dominant ideology. 15 
Only after the seeds have been planted can revolutionary thinkers 
begin to explore ideological limitations. Furthermore, Wollstonecraft 
was wholly in favor of the liberal values expressed by her bourgeois 
male contemporaries. The problem as she saw it was not the system 
itself, but the fact that those ideals for financial independence and 
individual accomplishment did not apply to women. Her goal, there­
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fore, was that of “extending the newly won rights of the middle-class 
man to the middle-class woman .”16 Hence, it should not be expected 
that Wollstonecraft would have attempted to develop a theory of 
women’s independence completely outside of the reigning ideology, 
particularly before the majority of women were fully conscious of 
their disadvantages within the existing system. A retrospective assess­
ment of her treatise reveals that, instead of giving us a radically 
revolutionary document, Wollstonecraft “creates an alternative, poten­
tially revolutionary female ideology within a scaffolding of cultural 
givens” (emphasis mine) . 17 Even today, two centuries after 
Wollstonecraft planted that seed, it is clear that we have still only 
begun to approach the “logical, radical extreme” of Wollstonecraft’s 
challenge.
What Wollstonecraft saw as her goal, then, was to create important, 
contributing roles for women in the new bourgeois society. Although 
she confines her descriptions to the traditional wife and mother roles, 
she also sees the powerful potential of these positions in a society 
where the nuclear family was to become so vital to the economic 
system. If women were educated and thus afforded the virtuous 
nature that Reason would insure, they would better educate their 
children into rational, virtuous adults. Therefore, women would form 
a powerful moral force behind the new bourgeois society. 18 However, 
what Wollstonecraft failed to perceive, according to Zillah Eisenstein, 
was the increasing division between the home and the economic 
system with women no longer participating in agriculture and domes­
tic industry beside their husbands . 19 With the rise of the middle-class, 
men began working more outside of the home, resulting in the 
complete exclusion of women from the economic system and their 
total dependence on their husbands’ incomes.
Just as the content of A Vindication may be justified from a feminist 
historical perspective, the reprimands concerning Wollstonecraft’s 
style merit a feminist linguistic approach. The primary judgm ent has 
been that, though Wollstonecraft was capable of logical theorizing and 
furthermore was addressing herself to men who respected Reason 
above all else, she often abandons her philosophical style and strays 
into emotional tirades lamenting the oppressed status of women .20 
Contemporary feminist theory founded on Lacanian linguistic prin­
ciples not only explains these diversions but also infers their necessity. 
In the way a language functions to divide up and filter the infinite 
realm of reality, much, if not all, of the way we perceive the world is 
determined, thus precluding other perspectives. Just as feminist critics 
claim that Western society is inherently patriarchal, so are its lan­
guages, meaning that our language can better express the “masculine”
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than the “feminine.” Thus, for a woman to speak of the “feminine,” 
she must attempt to work around the language’s inherent masculinity: 
“The challenge facing the woman today is nothing less than to 
‘reinvent’ language . . .  to speak not only against, but outside of the 
specular phallogocentric structure, to establish a discourse the status
of which would no longer be defined by the phallacy of masculine
• >>21 meaning. ^
Although Wollstonecraft undoubtedly had not developed this the­
oretical understanding of language, Elissa Guralnick points out that 
she instinctively sensed that logical discourse and the philosophical 
rhetoric employed by men could not fully express her ideas: “This 
argument may be carried further than philosophers are aware of .”22 
So in order to capture the proper tone for her argument, 
Wollstonecraft allowed herself a freedom in her philosophical dis­
course: “Animated by this important object, I shall disdain to cull my 
phrases or polish my style; —I aim at being useful, and sincerity will 
render me unaffected; for, wishing rather to persuade by the force of 
my arguments, than dazzle by the elegance of my language, I shall not 
waste my time in rounding periods, or in fabricating the turgid 
bombast of artificial feelings, which, coming from the head, never 
reach the heart .”23 Though Guralnick’s tone regarding 
Wollstonecraft’s refusal of “the usual requirements of reasoned dis­
course” suggests a condescending sneer at this idea of freedom, the 
“sacrifice” of logic is indeed necessary to deconstruct the rules of 
patriarchal discourse and to allow the expression of a woman’s point 
of view.24 This linguistic theory illustrates the feminist idea of 
marginality; because women are not an integral part of the power 
structure or its language, they are relegated to marginal roles in 
Western society. To express that decentered consciousness, women 
must develop new ways of speaking and writing on the edge of 
masculine denotations.
Guralnick believes that Wollstonecraft must have adopted her 
deviant style in A Vindication in order to provide women readers 
unaccustomed to philosophical discourse some stimulation and en­
couragement to continue reading .25 However, a feminist linguistic 
perspective would suggest that if Wollstonecraft did intend for women 
to read her treatise, as several direct addresses indicate, she may have 
chosen her subversive style in order to speak the marginal argot of 
women rather than just to adapt to their ignorance. The woman 
writer’s goal, as Luce Irigaray explains it, must be “to try to recover the 
place of her exploitation by language without allowing herself to be 
simply reduced to it. It is to resubmit herself . . .  to ideas—notably 
about her—elaborated in and through a masculine logic, but to ‘bring
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out’ by an effect of playful repetition what was to remain hidden: the 
recovery of a possible operation of the feminine in language .”26 
The most overt evidence of language’s inherent patriarchal nature 
exposes itself in the masculine terms which supposedly refer to all 
humanity rather than only men. Though Wollstonecraft does not 
make an issue of these linguistic distinctions, she does bring them to 
the reader’s attention. She points out that the various treatises written 
by men respecting the liberal rights of “man” actually apply only to 
the male sex; for example, she firmly censures Rousseau for writing a 
wholly separate tract on women prescribing their role in the new 
society as pleasant and pretty companions for men: “Warmly as I 
admire the genius of that able writer, whose opinions I shall often 
have occasion to cite, indignation always takes place of admiration, 
and the rigid frown of insulted virtue effaces the smile of compla­
cency, which his eloquent periods are wont to raise, when I read his 
voluptuous reveries.”27
By commenting on these distinctions, Wollstonecraft demonstrates 
her awareness of the importance of clarifying ambivalent gender 
terms in order to promote change. The illusion that philosophers’ 
terms refer to women as well as men has always functioned to pacify 
women into believing that their interests were being protected. 
Wollstonecraft also recognizes the ambivalence of the terms “mascu­
line” and “feminine” as they were used in her time (and are still used 
today). “Masculine” generally referred to such virtues as intelligence, 
independence, and strength, all those traits that an eighteenth- 
century woman would be reproached for demonstrating. “Feminine” 
virtue, on the other hand, was equated with such traits as delicacy, 
sensitivity, and obedience, terms Wollstonecraft recognized as barely 
polite euphemisms for weakness, ignorance, and slavery.
As Wollstonecraft believed that virtue should be founded on Reason 
and Reason alone, it follows that she would criticize this double 
standard for male and female virtue as well as the way it is disguised 
in ambivalent terms. Early in her treatise, she responds to the typical 
male criticism of “masculine” women: “If it be against the imitation of 
manly virtues, or, more properly speaking, the attainment of those 
talents and virtues, the exercise of which ennobles the human 
character . . .  all those who view [women] with a philosophic eye 
must, I should think, wish with me, that they may every day grow 
more and more masculine.”28
But Wollstonecraft did not admire all of the behaviors commonly 
considered manly in her time. For instance, she reproaches men for 
pursuing the sexual favors of women without consideration for the 
woman’s affection or, more importantly at that time, for her “vir-
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tue .”29 Consequently, Wollstonecraft advocates a new morality that 
combines the most reasonable of masculine and feminine virtues: 
chastity, modesty, and self-control from the female catalogue, and 
intelligence, strength, and independence from the male’s list.30 These 
she calls “hum an” virtues. By redefining these terms and exposing the 
double standards inherent in their popular use, Wollstonecraft pro­
gressed the emancipation of women in a thoroughly modern way: 
“The first step in making the ‘rights of man’ into the ‘rights of 
humanity’ and ‘masculine’ qualities into ‘hum an’ ones is to be aware of 
the persuasive effect of language and to use this effect to clarify rather 
than confuse.”31 Feminist linguists today are still battling with the 
linguistic clarity so necessary for our not yet realized emancipation.
One final topic regarding the criticisms against Wollstonecraft’s 
style pertains to Guralnick’s invective that Wollstonecraft strays from 
the social issue of women’s rights into unrelated political issues, such 
as the evils of monarchy and the standing army .32 As Sandra Gilbert 
reiterates what feminists have pointed out since the earliest days of the 
women’s movement, feminist issues cannot be distinguished from 
politics: “Not only is the personal the political; the aesthetic is the 
political, the literary is the political, the rhetorical is the political.”33 
The fact that Wollstonecraft could not have been familiar with the 
modern feminist use of the term “patriarchal” in reference to society 
and language did not prevent her from understanding the extent of 
change requisite to women’s fulfilling significant roles in the eco­
nomic, political, and social systems. In an age of vast political 
transition, Wollstonecraft was willing to work within the constructs of 
bourgeois ideology in the hope that reform would mean a complete 
restructuring of society, a revolution that would allow women the 
status claimed for “man.”
Considering the vast potential of A Vindication of the Rights of Woman 
for positive feminist interpretation, it is high time that advanced 
feminist scholars addressed this pioneering treatise. The issues I have 
touched on employing a conglomeration of feminist theory all can and 
should be considered in much more specific detail. It appears to me 
that no other body of theory can justify and explain so clearly the 
surprising relevance of A Vindication for today. Even though 
Wollstonecraft did not have modern theoretical terms at her disposal, 
there can be little doubt that she understood and expressed many of 
the basic premises of contemporary social and literary feminist issues: 
“Wollstonecraft came to understand the social conditions governing 
the lives of all women and to denounce their institutionalized repres­
sion—a social fact that she was the first to grasp in its entirety, and that
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her writings did most to change .”34
Her understanding also came in a time when patriarchy pro­
nounced its domination over every nuance of both personal and 
institutional society, a time unlike ours when the whispers of patriar­
chy only remind us that the battle is not yet won. So if the content of 
her treatise seems sometimes deferential and occasionally irrelevant, 
we must remember what Elaine Showalter writes about the 
nineteenth-century artist: “The feminist content of feminist art is 
typically oblique, displaced, ironic and subversive; one has to read it 
between the lines, in the missed possibilities of the text.”35 For 
instance, there is perhaps only one small moment in A Vindication 
where Wollstonecraft shyly expresses her true thesis: “A wild wish has 
just flown from my heart to my head, and I will not stifle it though it 
may excite a horse-laugh—I do earnestly wish to see the distinction of 
sex confounded in society.”36 This desire clearly places 
Wollstonecraft’s ideals as firmly in 1987 as in 1792. It is for this 
wonderful and sad reason that her treatise must be further examined 
and understood: “Unfortunately, Mary Wollstonecraft’s arguments, 
dated though they may be, have more than historical importance, for 
her particular battle has not altogether been won .”37
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